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On Political Obligation and Civil Disobedience
MULFORD Q. SIBLEY'
University of Minnesota
ABSTRACT-The problems of political obligation and civil disobedience have recently been reemphasized in the civil rights struggle, in student demonstrations of various kinds, and in direct
act ion connected with the peace movement. At the same time, men like the late President Kennedy have seemed to say that deliberate disobedience of law could never be countenanced.
In the light of controversies such as these, the present paper explores the disquietude about
'l egitimacy of political rule in the Western political tradition; restates and evaluates several of the
views that seek to give an account of political obligation; and formulates a possible way of viewing obligation and the conditions under which civil disobedience might be both a right and a
duty. No historical political system, the paper argues, has ever been completely legitimate, so
that under certain circumstances the possibility, right, and obligation of civil disobedience must
be understood to be open.

The United States, during the past five years, has given
birth lo new versions of very old issues in dramatizing
such central questions as the bases of political obligation
and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of civil disobedience.
In Birmingham, while in prison, Martin Luther King
wrote his Letter from Birmingham Jail in which he restated the justification for deliberate disobedience of law;
and in Berkeley, California, a similar problem was posed
during the autumn of 1964 by leaders of the greatest
student revolt of the present generation. At the same
time , public officials seek to restate the duty to obey law,
apparently without qualification. Thus, the late President
Kennedy, in 1962. maintained that Americans were not
free to choose the laws they should obey (N.Y. Times,
1962: 22); and Senator Goldwater, in the campaign of
1964, denounced those who, in his judgment, were condoning both direct action in general and civil disobedience in particular (N .Y. Times, 1964:12) . Recent articles, moreover, have given a certain popularity to the
issue (Bedau , I 961; Cohen, 1964; Frankel, 1964); and
dry questions that a few years ago seemed to be appropriate only for desiccated professors of political philosophy have suddenly taken on new life.
There is, of course, a long tradition that may cast
considerable light on the current discussion of political
obligation and civil disobedience. This paper proposes to
re-examine certain aspects of that tradition , to relate
th em to the contemporary debate, and to vindicate both
the right and the obligation of civil disobedience.
Three points are developed. First, the long-standing
disquietude about the cl aims of the State to our obedience is examined . We seek to illustrate this by reference
lo certain classical statements of St. Augustine, and to
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adapt these statements to the uncertainties of others and
to the language of our own day. Secondly, we remind
ourselves of the various doctrines that, in light of the
· disquietude, have been advanced to provide a basis for
political obligation. Noting the merits and weaknesses
of each, it is argued that no one of them furni shes an
adequate foundation for political obligation. Thirdly ,
building upon the fact of uneasiness and such insights
as are provided by the several accounts of obligation,
the attempt is made to restate a basis for obligation and
to develop criteria for judging when civil disobedience
is legitimate.
The Disquietude About Legitimacy

The anxiety concerning legitimacy may be illustrated
if we recall the dilemmas confronted by St. Augustine,
the fifth-century Church Father, who sought to evaluate
all political systems in terms of their justice . On the one
hand, he conceived of a city of God , whose members
are destined for salvation, who are pure in heart, and
who are members of the heavenly city. On the other side
are those condemned to spiritual death, who have turned
away from God, and whose destiny is presumably hell.
The cities or states of human history stand between the
city of God and the city of the damned, since any given
historical society will be composed of both tI1e saved and
the condemned. Out of this commingling of heavenly and
nonheavenly citizens arises political authority to provide
a kind of uneasy peace pending the coming of the end
of history, the elate of which no man knows and which
may be imminent or remote in time.
What puzzles Augustine - and presumably all those
exercised about the issue of political obligation - is
whether any distinction can be made between and among
the types of political authority he has known or about
which he has read. Are all of equal value and equally entitled to obedience? Or are some legitimate and others
illegitimate? If so, how do we distinguish between the
legitimate and the illegitimate? In Augustine's thinking,
political authority did not exist in Eden but is the result
of the necessity for coercion that accompanies the Fall
of Man . Can distinctions be made between and among
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historical soc1et1es, so that one feels a greater sense of
obligation to some than to others - always keeping in
mind that all grow out of wickedness?
Augustine tried out two alternative answers (Bk. II,
Ch . 21; Bk. IV., Ch. 4 ; Bk . XIX, Ch. 21, 23, and 24) .
His first point of departure was Cicero's statement that
a people is a multitude of men associated together by a
common acknowledgment of right and a community of
interests. Augustine interpreted "right" to mean "true
justice. " And true justice includes not only giving to
each man his due and to society what belongs to it, but
also genuine worship of the one true God. Taking these
requirements together, he concluded that there had been
in reality no just society in history. Yet without justice,
he asked, what is any kingdom but a great robbery? R em ow Justitia quid regna nisi magna /atrocinia? From this
point of view, no historic political society has satisfied the
Augustinian criterion of legitimacy and, inferentially, our
obligation to all such societies reaches the vanishing
point.
But he tended to withdraw in horror from what seems
to be the logic of his position and he asked whether there
may not be a more reasonable or, perhaps, usable definition of a people. He found the clue to his second conception in the fact that while all historic political societies have been little better than "robberies," it is equally
true that even robber bands have at least one of the characteristics of Cicero's popu/us: They are associations of
men united by the objects of their love and with rules for
the distribution of spoils. Although they may not be just
in terms of their ends, they do and must provide a certain ordering - if only to carry out robbery efficiently
and to distribute the spoils according to regular rules and order is valuable regardless of its goals. At le ast, it
is better than disorder. Or, as a modern scholar has put
it, there is "law" even among the "outlaws." ( Merriam ,
1934: Ch. Ill). Every robber band, Augustine suggested ,
is a little kingdom and , contrariwise, every kingdom is
an enlarged robber band. Both provide a measure of order and, perhaps, this is about all we can expect in this
world of fallen men. The implication of this view would
seem to be that every well established power structure,
since it at least establishes order, has a certain claim on
our obedience . By contrast with his true justice test of
legitimacy, Augustine's second-level definition would
seem to open the way to a well nigh unqualified notion
of obligation. And, indeed, he seemed to suggest precisely this: The only ground for disobedience is presumably a specific Scriptural command ( Deane, 1963: 147,

89, 90).
Nor is St. Augustine the only great thinker to give evidence of a profound uncertainty over the degree of legitimacy present in political societies. Although St. Thomas
Aquinas seemed to think that even relatively bad governments may be implicitly seeking good ends, he appeared to imply the very mixed character of all political
rule and he envisioned occasions on which men may
have to consider disobedience. Luther was bothered by
the contrast between the maxims of the Sermon on the
Mount, on the one hand. and the apparent imperatives
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of statecraft, on the other. Rousseau appeared to think:
that most historic political authority has been - at least
in considerable measure - simply a disguise for illegitimate ends. As for the Marxist tradition, it is Augustinian in its despair about any possibility of congruence between "justice" and historic states, but hopeful in its
belief that the historic process itself will provide a ··solution" by wiping out all class-biased (and therefore unjust) organizations. thus opening the way for a true morality .
Obviously, the disquietude expressed by many thinkers has a foundation in our actual experience. Governments that exist presumably to promote peace actually
encourage war on a large scale ( Cook, J 962). Rulers
established to help guarantee freedom tend to destroy it.
Governing classes placed in control of the state machinery by an originally democratic process become oligarchies and thus restrict or destroy the process.
Under circumstances of this kind, can one wonder at
Augustine's despair or be surprised by his tendency to
state, in effect, that any kind of order must be obeyed,
since it is at least an order? Can we escape his seeming
conclusion that in effect all political societies are, relative
to true justice, at about the same level, and that 1t 1s
hopeless to differentiate between and among them with
any certainty?
Legitimacy and Obligation

Despite this ubiquitous disquietude about the possibility of distinguishing political societies from one another.
the tradition of political philosophy has obviously made
some attempt to do so.
The Naturalist View

Perhaps the most persistent effort to construct a theory
of political obligation has been that of what we might call
the naturalists. Although there arc many rather diverse
views included under this designation, they have in common the notion that man 's true ends can be rationally
determined, can be separated from false ends , and can
furnish a foundation for natural law whose precepts will
provide grounds for distinguishing between legitimate and
illegitimate rule. By this account, man is a polit1cal animal whose ends are naturally fulfilled only within a political society. That system of rule is binding, then. which
conforms in its main outlines to the precepts of Nature
conceived as a rationally discovered system of ends or
goals. Beginning with such presumably self-evident propositions as that we should seek the good and avoid the
evil, the naturalists then ask what the good for man may
be held to be. Their answer turns on an examination of
his natural needs, whether biological, social, or spiritual.
From these needs they deduce such principles as that
order is essential; that government is necessary for order;
that legitimate government is that that enhances achievement of goals natural to man and discourages ends that
are unnatural. The individual's obligation to obey positive law turns on the degree to which it expresses natural
law, or at least does not contradict it.
One difficulty with natural law conceptions in differ-
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entiating between legitimate and illegitmate systems of
rule is that the distinction between natural and unnatural
ends is not easy to determine. What is natural tends to be
a function of the culture, and objective standards, where
they may be held to exist, are ambiguous at best. ls the
government of the United States legitimate, for example?
The present Constitution was adopted by procedures that
violated the law of the land at the time. Is not the admonition to act according to positive law a principle of
natural law? Why, under natural law principles, am I
obliged to obey the Constitution? Some naturalists might
say that because it has existed for a long time and has
been generally obeyed, "prescription" makes the government established under it legitimate, hence obligatory.
But does this imply that anything old - e .g., the institution of war - carries with it the odor of moral sanctity
simply because of that fact? This is simply one example
of the many questions on which naturalist views seem to
cast a light that is uncertain at best.
Contract

According to another pos1t1on, contract provides the
!basis for obligation. Although many versions of the contract theory have existed - among them those of Hobbes,
Locke. Rousseau, for example - they have in common the
notion that each of us has made an agreement with his
fellows to obey a government - either under certain specified conditions and limitations ( as with Locke) or without qualification.
The objections to contract theories are numerous.
When did members of the present generation contract
with one another to obey the rules of a document drawn
up in l 787? When did the British agree to obey the government of William the Conqueror - that "bastard" leading an .. mmed banditti," as Tom Paine used to call him after 1066? Even if we maintain that a given generation
agrees to submit itself to political rule, why is this alleged
contract binding on future generations who have made no
such specific agreement? Nor does the doctrine of an implicit consent stated by such thinkers as Socrates ( in Plato's Criro) and Locke meet the issue, for by the time I
have reached the age of discretion, I have been so conditioned bv the culture and language of a nation that my
decision to remain in that nation is hardly a free one.
Yet another important question is whether we should
regard the keeping of promises - a central value imperative under contract theories - as the supreme value. To
be sure, the principle that promises should be fulfilled is
an important one, but it would seem doubtful that it
ought to take precedence over all other considerations in
making up one's mind about what is right at a given
moment: and if one accept this notion, promises should
be only one factor in making a decision on what is right.
My promise can never be interpreted as one committing
me t-0 obey under all circumstances and regardless of my
sense of right at a particular time.
Utility

Some have asserted that obligation might be based on
utility. If the government promotes more pleasure than
Journal of, Volume Thirty-three, No. I, 1965

pain, said the nineteenth-century utilitarians, and assuming that pleasure is equivalent to "good" and pain to
"evil," then I am obliged to obey, since it is to my interest to do so. The great merit of a utilitarian view is that
it attempts to make less vague such often rationalizing
formulae as "vital interests" and "general welfare." On
the other hand, it is obvious that even a utilitarian
scheme must begin with propositions not derived from
utility; and since "obligation" tends to be identified with
"interest," the problem of obligation, as Carritt has
pointed out (Carritt, 1935), is really evaded or ignored.
Organicism

Organicist positions have something in common with
naturalist statements but need not put their viewpoint in
terms of a natural law. ln the tradition stemming from
Rousseau and Hegel, and embracing, to some extent,
such thinkers as Green, the general will of the moral
community binds me because it is the true or real will
of myself. Thus I am obliged to obey because I have a
moral duty to transcend the limitations of my "empirical"
self and to release the "true self" that is struggling to be
born-a self, purged of egoism, that understands that only
obedience to the general will can make for moral progress. My empirical self, which operates in terms of selfinterest, can be transcended only by being constantly reminded through law of the unselfish being that is constantly at war with it. Out of this conflict arises the distinction between mere "interest" and "obligation." The
former means unlimited freedom to express my present
self, the latter the freedom to do what I ought in terms
of my rational self.
There are many difficulties with the organicist position; among them is the problem of discovering the identity of the true self. This problem is similar to the question confronted by the naturalist when he attempts to
find out the meaning of right reason or the ends of Nature. Does the law of every historical state, for example
- no matter what its contents may be - automatically
identify my true self? The historical state notoriously reflects compromise and clashing economic interests. In
what sense, then, can it be said to speak for my true or
moral self?
Evaluation of Views

The upshot of all this is that all traditional accounts
of the basis of political obligation are inadequate in one
or more respects. At the same time, if we do not push
them too far, each of them gives us an insight into the
complexity of treating obligation, and each, moreover,
points up one aspect of the problem. Naturalist views
surely reflect an important desideratum for any doctrine
of legitimacy- a nonarbitrary, nonconventional set of
standards by which we can judge political authority. Contract positions dramatize the notion that authority to be
binding must repose on consent as well as embody the
morally defensible statements stressed by the naturalist. Utilitarian views warn us against taking refuge in
such unsatisfactory and vague expressions as "national
interest" or "national honor." Finally, organicist ideas
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rightly stress the social and political dimensions of what
we call "personality" and, therefore, the unreality of
completely discrete "individuals."
An adequate theory of obligation will have to take account of both the strengths and the weaknesses embodied
in the several traditional views.
Disquietude, Obligation and Civil Disobedience

Having now suggested the anxiety about political society and having summarized important attempts to provide an adequate foundation for political obligation, I
turn, in this last section, to (a) a restatement of the issue of political obligation that will take account of both
Augustine's dilemma and the weaknesses and strengths
in the several analyses of obligation, and ( b) a justification. under certain circumscribed conditions, of civil
disobedience.
Restatement of the Issue

A theory of obligation requires, first, a delineation of
what a fully legitimate authority would be; second, a
similar sketch of an ideal-type illegitimate ruler; and
third, judgment of all historical authorities by standards
arising out of our standards of legitimacy and illegitimacy. Our obligation is greatest to those alleged authorities that endeavor by their actions to approximate legitimacy, and least to those that appear to forget the criteria
of moral licitness.
From the viewpoint of this paper-and of an important
t~a_dition in Western political thought-a completely leg1t1mate authority is one that exists in a society that has
reconciled our consciousness of individuality with our
feeling of belonging to others. In such a society-envisioned in greater or lesser degree by such thinkers as St.
Thomas Aquinas, Rousseau, Marx, Engels, and Lenineach person would be free and spontaneous and yet
wourd be associated with his fellows for collective endeavors. The order demanded when men mingle with
one another would not find itself in tension with personaJities that have ends beyond the social order.
In a perfectly legitimate society, it would seem, the
coordinating machinery of the society, so necessary
when men become specialized in their tasks, would primarily administer " things," as the Marxist communist
version would have it. Direct coercion of men, and particularly the utilization of physical force, would vanish.
Law would become, in Emerson's pregnant words, a
mere ''memorandum"; and once individual personalities
read the words of the memorandum, they would see immediately the legitimacy of its prescriptions. Law ··making"
itself would be the end result of a consensus-oath.
b
enng process, with formal voting reduced to the vanishing point. The pull of special economic interests would
have been abolished through common ownership and
administration of resources, and distribution in accordance with need (a need that each self-disciplined individual would determine). Taxation as we know it today
would have vanished, since collective necessities would
be supplied from the total product before individual distribution could take place. Armies would, of course, be
no more. Complete freedom of expression would obtain.
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Under conditions of this kind. in other words. authority would, so to speak, be fully authoritative and would
carry its own "power." Vera jus1i1ia-true justice-would
obtain.
If, now, one were to imagine an ideal type illegitimate
system of political relations, one need only spell out the
reverse of the picture of legitimacy. The coordinating
machinery of society woul'd manipulate men for its own
ends in such a way that they would not even be aware of
their own exploitation. If perchance they resisted, force
without stint would be applied, sometimes without even
the pretense of using forms of law. Law and principles
of morality would be determined completely by the ruling classes, any distinction between right and might being eliminated. Threats of various kinds would keep the
population cowed and submissive. Law would be imposed with no explanation of the reasons supporting it.
Armies would, of course, play an important role, one
road to political power being success in military intimidation. Spontaneity would be discouraged in every way,
even in the realms of sport and recreation.
This dichotomization between legitimate and illegitimate is obviously based on a particular view of what the
conception of humanity implies by way of social ordering, and in this respect the notion of legitimacy is directly connected with those perspectives that earlier were
termed naturalist-in the sense that legitimacy implies a
situation in which man's true nature has been fulfilJed.
But there are also elements of the contractual, insofar as
consent becomes a fully developed and genuine ingredient in political relations. Utilitarian ideas are relevant,
too, at least to the degree that authority would necessarily have to appeal to judgments about consequences and
would have to define objectives in concrete terms. Finally, organicist conceptions are mirrored in the overcoming of the alienation of men from their fellov.s .
Just as Augustine's first definition of a commonwealth
emphasized the fact that no historical society is fully legitimate, so does my formulation maintain the highly
mixed and morally ambiguous character of all past and
present regimes. Every political system is partly robbery
and piracy and yet it is also, in terms of Augustine's
second definition, some kind of order that ,ve deem valuable . At best, any given historical scheme can be justified only relatively and our obligation is only a r-:lative
or conditional one.
What criteria can we discover for distinguishing between relatively legitimate and relatively illegitimate regimes?
We might see an answer , first , in terms of the procedures whereby decisions are reached and, second. in relation to the substance of the decisions themselve~ .
With respect to procedures, any claimed authority that
closes avenues to the enhancement of its legitimacy
would seem to be attacking the principle of authority at
its roots. Thus any quasi-authority that cuts oft criticisms, reduces freedom of expression, or deliberately
withholds information is undermining the basic foundations in that it is denying the means for nonviolent
change in the direction of greater legitimacy. Other pro-
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cedural values are scarcely less important, and for the
same reason: among these are reasonably nonarbitrary
procedures in criminal and civil courts and the absence
of too wide a discretion in the sphere allocated to the executive . In general, any serious denial of the rule of law
subjects a regime to the charge of too great a degree of
illegitimacv.
fr the f~amework allows change and progress in the
direction of full authority, then the substance of many
decisions can be tolerated, if not fully approved, on
grounds either that they are ethically neutral or that,
given the actual conditions obtaining, they may be relatively justified. Thus, under conditions of perfect legitimacy, physical coercion would disappear. Within the relativities of history, however, some coercion under certain
specific circumstances might be regarded as supportable.
But some decisions would seem to be ruled out in a
virtuallv absolute sense. Thus the deliberate and premeditated taking of life under the guise of "authority"
would appear to be beyond the pale. This prohibition of
deliberate killing might be said to derive from the notion
that a central function of authority is to enhance life and
not to destroy it. In particular circumstances, to be sure,
we might well be uncertain as to what constitutes deliberate and premeditated taking of life as against accidental or unintended killing; but surely capital punishment and war would be ruled out, at a minimum.
Then. too, a high substantative priority would be a
property system that assures a livelihood for all, even
though distribution of economic power might be far from
the norms of pure legitimacy. The property question assumes high-order priority because of its close relation to
the objective of enhancing life.
The~e. then, are among the most significant of the
procedural and substantive values, the denial of which
by the quasi-authorities of history would seem to reduce
political obligation to the vanishing point and open the
way for morally legitimate civil disobedience. Having
sketched out ideal-type legitimacy and illegitimacy and
their adaptation to the relativities of history, the principles under which civil disobedience may be justified can
now be spelled out.
Justification of Civil Disobedience

Those who would support civil disobedience, we suggest, must act with a sense of responsibility, give the
benefit of the doubt to the Jaw, be fairly certain that basic
norms of procedure and substance have been violated,
disobey overtly rather than covertly, act nonviolently ,
and recognize that the individual himself, rather than a
group, has the right and obligation to decide when civil
disobedience is required.
Responsibility. By responsibility is meant that the purpose and possible consequences of the proposed civil
disobedience must be carefully weighed before the decision is made. Thus mere impulse must be ruled out as
incompatible with rational human action.
Benefit of the Doubt. Fully admitting that any given
legal and political system is a mixture of the aspiration
for legitimacy and an attack on legitimacy, the benefit of
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any doubt, it would seem , should be given to the existing
law or decree. This is because we can share with Augustine the view that the value of order - any kind of order,
or, in other terms, any system of mutual expectations-is
so great that unless the system can be shown to be gravely deficient in its moral underpinnings, it must be assumed to have a certain claim, however bastardized .
Norms of Procedure and Substance Violated. In deciding whether the presumption of obligation to obey is
to be overthrown, reference should be made to the notion of legitimacy suggested earlier, both in its ideal-typical form and in its adaptation to the exigencies and relativities of the historical situation . First of all, one should
give primary weight to procedures and to the notion of
rank ordering of values in the procedural framework. A
system of rule that disregards the basic norms of even
relative authority is contradicting its implicit purpose,
which is, let us repeat, a more solidly based authority
from the moral point of view. Similarly, to the extent
that the basic substance of decisions contradicts the ends
for which quasi-authorities are established, to that degree does claimed authority cease to be morally obligatory, even in a relative sense.
Thus when alleged authority silences a man through
intimidation, takes a life in war, kills a person under the
guise of punishment, or deprives human beings of livelihoods through an inadequate property system, it thereby
undermines its own authority and correspondingly weakens its claims on my obedience. After a certain point has
been reached, if I do obey it will he because of sheer expediency and not by virtue of a sense of obligation.
It was considerations of this kind that led Martin Luther King, in 1963, to violate court orders forbidding him
to protest segregation (King, 1963: 7); that impelled
students at the University of California to occupy buildings in violation of law; and that often send the conscientious objector to jail for refusing to register under the
conscription law.

Overt, Not Covert Disobedience . It is precisely because the civilly disobedient take seriously their political
obligation that they feel impelled to violate the law deliberatefy and overtly. They make public announcement
of it, accept responsibility, and stand ready to suffer the
consequences in terms of a penalty. They disobey because they value law and deem the rule they are violating to be either no law ( the natural law view) or bad
law ( the positivist position). Although they recognize
that no alleged law can be fuUy authoritative in the
mixed world characteristic of history, they insist that it
must meet certain minimum requirements lest it destroy
its very raison d'etre. They thus vindicate the principle
of law in the very act of violating a particular command.
Non-Violence. The disobedience must not only be
overt but also nonviolent. One cannot consistently protest against the undermining of authority by the historical state and, at the same time, utilize violence in the
process. For violence runs counter to the idea of moral
authority, it denigrates human personality, and, in effect,
it subverts the foundations of the order to which I am
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appealing as a civilly disobedient person. Thus violent
revolution tends to be self defeating, destroying the
foundations of moral order while it claims to be seeking
a more nearly legitimate authority. When violence is
used to secure revolutionary change, it is as illegitimate
and therefore as unauthoritative as the violence of a war
waged by the quasi-authorities of history.
Decision by the Individual. In deciding whether to be
disobedient, the individual in the end must be guided by
his own conscience.
Some thinkers, to be sure, are dissatisfied with conclusions of this kind, protesting that the individual cannot
and must not determine when he should and should not
obey. Typical of these critics is Dr. Will Herberg, who
wrote:
Every man has his conscience; and if the individual conscience is absolutized ( that is, divinized),
and made the final judge of laws to be obeyed or
disobeyed, nothing but anarchy and the dissolution
of the very fabric of government would result (National Review, 1964, p. 580).
In response to such objections, we might well remind
ourselves that "conscience" originally meant "joint
knowledge" and that in considerable measure it still has
this connotation. One's conscience about a particular
matter is developed within a social context, is nourished
by constant testing against the views of others, is not the
product of mere impulse, and is animated by a sense of
responsibility both to humanity and to oneself. Both naturalist and organicist views would stress this conception;
and some versions even of contractualist and utilitarian
positions would not dissent. In other words, the conscience cannot be regarded as the vain subjective ghost
of some mythical discrete individual.
We might also ask who should make the decision, if
not the individual person . Where would Dr. Herberg
turn? To the church? But which church? And how can
we assume that the church is a better judge of matters of
right and wrong than the individual? To the state? But
would the historical state ever advise us to break its
laws? And how can we differentiate the state from Augustine's band of robbers without appealing to an authority beyond the state? Would Dr. Herberg have recognized Hitler's state as authoritative? If not, whose
judgment, if not his own, would he have accepted?
There would seem to be no alternative to the individual conscience. Informed and carefully examined, it must
be the final judge of civil disobedience, as of other matters , Even if it be in error, it must still be followed , as
St. Thomas Aquinas has so persuasively argued (Summa, First Part of 11, Q. IX, Art. 5; Quodlibet, 27).
As for the charge of anarchy, it has been the burden
of this paper to maintain that any legal or political system is far safer in the hands of those who obey or disobey law on conscientious grounds-and with a more or
less conscious doctrine of obligation in the background
-than it is in the custody of those who either obey or
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disobey law without thought and without cnt1c1sm. An
historical order reposing on conscience may have elements of durability; but one bottomed on unreflective
obedience and impulsive disobedience can be swept away
by whim and happenstance. Possible civil disobedience
is the price we pay for an order resting, in part at least,
on awareness that an historical regimes are in some
degree illegitimate and may have to be resisted. But
this price is far less than the moral and social charge
assessed when we assume that all alleged law must be
automatically obeyed; for automatic obedience implies
automatons in the guise of men-a denial of the aspiration for autonomy and moral authority, which is the
most distinctive quality of humanity.
In our day particularly, with its arge-scale manipulation of human beings, the civilly disobedient may not
only vindicate their own personal integrity but also render a genuine social service. They vividly remind us that
all power tends to corrupt ; that shock techniques are
needed to recall so-called democracies to their own principles; that elites often become both stupid and immoral;
and, to recur to St. Augustine, that only a relatively thin
line may separate the ruler claiming political authority
from the pirate chief.
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